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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1ST OK CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
No. 14334
MORRIS H. CURTIS and SADIE P. CURTIS,
his wife; and UTAH TITLE & ABSTRACT CO.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff to specifically enforce the
terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Defendants Curtis counterclaimed,
asking that the contract be rescinded because of the fraudulent representations of the president of plaintiff corporation. Defendant Utah Title & Abstract Co. agreed to be bound by the order of the Court regardless of the outcome between the other parties, since no affirmative relief was asked against it.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and judgment in favor of
defendants Curtis, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and a new trial.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

^,

On January 15, 1972, plaintiff, through its president, Orland Fiandaca,
entered into an agreement with defendants Morris H. Curtis and Sadie P.
Curtis for the purchase of land near Salina, Utah (Tr. 97, 98). When it
was discovered that additional land would be needed for the use Mr. Fiandaca
had planned for the property, a new agreement was reached (Ex. P 4 l ) and
the old one destroyed (Tr 98-100). Under the date of December 15, 1972,
the transaction was closed by the parties entering into a Uniform Real Estate
Contract (Ex. P41A), a Trust Agreement (Ex. P42), a Warranty Deed
(Ex. P I ) and approving a Closing Statement (Ex. P43). There was a significant conflict in the evidence at trial concerning the date that the documents were signed. Mr. and Mrs. Curtis both testified that they were not
signed until January 3, 1973 (Tr 73A, 359, 360, 427). However, all other
witnesses testified that they were signed on December 15, 1972 (Tr 129,
130, 135, 331, 332, 434), and the Warranty Deed was actually recorded
on December 15, 1972 (Tr 134, 135, 333). The closing resulted in the
property being conveyed in trust to Utah Title and Abstract Co., with payments being made to that entity. Parcels of property were to be released as
they were paid for under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. A
dispute arose over whether a payment had been made timely, and on August
19, 1974, plaintiff filed a Complaint asking for specific performance of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract, or damages in the alternative (R 1). Defendants Curtis filed a Counterclaim asking that the contract be rescinded because
of the fraudulent representations of plaintiff's president, Mr. Fiandaca, or in
the alternative forfeiture of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R 15). The
specific representations claimed to be false were:
(a)

That the company was a corporation under the laws of the

State of Utah and was, therefore, a good buyer, financially sound and able
to guarantee all of the performances and payments due under the Uniform
Real Estate Contract dated the 15 th day of December, 1972.
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(b)

That Mr. and Mrs. Curtis should not go to an attorney, that

attorneys were expensive and that they would be properly secured by the
contract which was drafted in accordance with Mr. Fiandaca's instruction and
that he would take them to Utah Title and Abstract Co., specialists in real
property matters, who would make certain that they were adequately secured
and would suffer no financial injury or damage.
(c)

That Mr. Fiandaca was an expert in developing commercial

property and that he would effectively negotiate with the State of Utah and
all other interested persons to make certain that adjoining property retained
by them would be substantially increased in value, and see that the State of
Utah granted suitable access rights to a proposed interstate highway so that
their adjoining properties could be developed for commercial purposes.
(d)

That it would reserve adequate easements and access rights

to and from the interstate highway for the benefit of their adjacent property.
(e)

That it would reserve for their benefit all gas, oil and min-

eralrights(R 17, 18).
At the pre-trial (Tr. 3-51) counsel for defendants raised another issue
that was not in the pleadings, the claim that Mr. Fiandaca had represented
the property to include only 70 acres, when, in fact, it included 90 acres.
This had the effect of postponing the trial from its initially scheduled trial
date of June 23, 1975, to July 14, 1975. On the morning of the first day of
the trial, counsel for defendants Curtis, for the first time, raised the issue of
a confidential or fiduciary relationship existing between Mr. Fiandaca and
Mr. and Mrs. Curtis. This was raised by the proposed instructions (R 48)
submitted by counsel for those defendants during a conference with the Trial
Judge. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the raising of this new issue (Tr. 431).
He also took exception to Instructions 14, 15, 16, 17 and Interrogatory No.
1, 2, 3 and 4 (Tr. 445), each of which dealt with or discussed the issue of
confidential relationship.
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t ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ISSUE WAS RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON THE OPENING DAY OF TRIAL.
Where an issue has not been framed in either the pleadings or the PreTrial Order, it is improper to allow the issue to be raised over the objection
of opposing counsel. Youngren vs. John W. Lloyd Construction Company,
22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales,
Inc. vs. Lords, 23 Utah 2d 152, 460 P.2d 321 (1969). See also Case vs.
Abrams, 152 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1965).

.

Pace vs. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), citing Stuck vs.
Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791 (1924), outlines the
nine essential elements of actionable fraud, and holds that the burden of
proving those elements is on the party alleging such fraud. The instructions
and interrogatories to the jury covering confidential relationship, however,
completely changed that burden of proof and the jury's attitude toward the
entire case. Those instructions and interrogatories are:
Instruction No. 14
You are instructed that a confidential relationship may exist
between two parties where one party places trust and confidence
in the other concerning his business, economic or financial affairs.
The person in whom that trust or confidence is placed is sometimes called a "fiduciary/' A "fiduciary" relationship and a "confidential" relationship are the same thing.
In order to have a confidential relationship the person placing trust or confidence in the other must not only have a high
regard for that person's ability and knowledge in a certain field,
but he must also rely upon that confidence in entering into transactions of a business, financial, or economic nature in the same
area or field. A person in order to be the fiduciary of another
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must possess a superior knowledge of the subject matter of the
relationship between the parties, believing that the advice given
him by the fiduciary will operate to his benefit, must rely upon said
advice, instruction, recommendations, or suggestions given to him
by the fiduciary so as to create a duty on the part of the fiduciary
to observe the confidence, and it must result in a situation where
there is superior influence on one side and dependence on the other
and substitution of the will of the fiduciary for that of the other
party in the transaction.
You are further instructed that the party claiming the existence of the confidential relationship has the burden of proving
the foregoing elements of that relationship by a preponderance
of the evidence (R 76).
Instruction No. 15
You are instructed that a fiduciary, or a person in whom
another has placed trust or confidence, cannot profit by that relationship without the complete knowledge and consent of the other
party, fully disclosed to him by the fiduciary.
You are further instructed that if a fiduciary or a person occupying a confidential relationship to another, enters into a business transaction between himself and that other person concerning
the same subject matter as the one upon which the confidence is
based, the transaction must be entirely fair or it will be declared
void by the courts at the election of the person damaged.
You are further instructed that the fiduciary in such cases
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, as
that term has been explained to you in these instructions, that the
transaction was in all respects fair and fully disclosed by the fiduciary to the other party (R 77).
Instruction No. 16
Therefore, if you find from the evidence that Mr. and Mrs.
Morris H. Curtis had reason to place and, in fact, placed trust and
confidence in Or land Fiandaca of 1st OK Corporation and made
him their fiduciary as the term has been explained to you in Instruction No. 14, in matters pertaining to either the value of their
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land, the best way to dispose of it, manage, or develop it, or relied
upon his descriptions of their property or Mr. Fiandaca's statements
or suggestions concerning the amount of acreage involved in their
transactions with Mr. Fiandaca, or relied upon his recommendations
of ways to enter into contracts with respect to their land by a means
that he declared would be advantageous to the Curtises, you will
find that a confidential relationship existed between them.
Thus, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
those elements of a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed
with respect to any contract entered into, then it will be your
further duty to determine whether or not the agreement or agreements were entered into between the parties as a result of reliance
placed by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis upon the advice, suggestions or
recommendations of Mr. Fiandaca. If you find that any such agreements were entered into by Curtises in reliance upon that advice,
suggestions, or recommendation, then you must determine whether
or not such agreement or agreements were in all respects fair to
the Curtises and all advantage to be received by Mr. Fiandaca or
his 1st OK Corporation fully disclosed to Curtises before the contract in question was entered into.
If, in your opinion, Mr. Fiandaca has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the contract or contracts entered
into under that reliance were fair to Mr. and Mrs. Curtis or that
the advantage to Mr. Fiandaca or the disadvantage to Mr. and
Mrs. Curtis was not fully disclosed by Mr. Fiandaca prior to entering into that contract, or contracts, you are instructed to find any
such agreement void (R 78).
Instruction No. 17
You are instructed that if an agreement is procured by fraud
and misrepresentation that it is voidable at the option of the person injured.
Before you can find fraud or misrepresentation sufficient to
nullify a contract, you must find clear and convincing evidence
of each of the following elements:
1. That there was a representation of a presently existing
material fact.
2. That the representation was untrue.
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3. That the person making the representation knew the same
to be false or made the representation recklessly, knowing that he
had insufficient knowledge or information upon which to base such
representation, or that said representation was made with an unconcern or disregard as to whether it was true or false.
4. That the representation was made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act in reliance on it.
5. That the other party reasonably had the right to rely upon
said representation, and acting responsibly and being ignorant of
their falsity, did rely upon said representation; and
6. That the person relying thereupon suffered damage.
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the elements of fraud must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence and that Mr. and Mrs.
Curtis have the burden of proving clearly and convincingly that
the foregoing elements existed.
However, you are nevertheless instructed that if you find from
the preponderance of the evidence that a confidential or fiduciary
relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendants, as that
relationship has been explained to you in these instructions, and
that any contract was induced or influenced by that relationship
and that the plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the contract was fair to Mr. and Mrs. Curtis or
that Mr. Fiandaca fully and fairly disclosed to Mr. and Mrs. Curtis
any advantage to him and any disadvantage to them, then that finding alone will be sufficient to sustain a verdict in favor of the
defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Curtis, and against plaintiff, 1st OK
Corporation, and it is not necessary that Mr. and Mrs. Curtis prove
the elements of fraud and undue influence as they have been enumerated in this instruction (R 79,80).
Interrogatory 1: Do you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that a confidential relationship, as that term has been
explained to you in Instruction No. 13, existed at the time of
the first preliminary agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Curtis and
Orland Fiandaca of 1st OK Corporation concerning the land owned
by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis (R 84) ?
Interrogatory 2: If your answer to the foregoing interrogatory is "yes," do you find that Mr. Fiandaca and 1st OK Corporation
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have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
preliminary agreement between the parties was fair to Mr. and Mrs.
Curtis? (If you find the agreement was made as the result of a
confidential relationship between the parties, you are to answer
"yes" to this question unless the plaintiff has carried the burden
of proving the contract was fair.)
Interrogatory 3: If your answer to interrogatory number one
is "yes," do you find that 1st OK Corporation has failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that any profit or advantage
of Mr. Fiandaca or 1st OK Corporation or any disadvantage to Mr.
and Mrs. Curtis in the first preliminary agreement was fully and
completely disclosed by Mr. Fiandaca before it was entered into?
(If you find that Mr. Fiandaca received any advantage and the
Curtises any disadvantage by the first preliminary agreement and
plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that such advantage or disadvantage was fully and fairly disclosed
by Mr. Fiandaca before the agreement was entered into, you are
to answer this interrogatory "yes.")
Interrogatory 4: Do you find from the evidence that on or
before January 21, 1972, Mr. Fiandaca sought and obtained an
amendment to the previous agreement between the parties by
which amendment he obtained or would have obtained rights in
an additional 40 acres of land owned by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis while
failing to disclosed that face [fact] or while representing to defendants or allowing them to believe Mr. Fiandaca was obtaining
rights in only an addition[al] 20 acres of land (R 85)?
Thus, the issue of confidential relationship became the single most important issue of the case, to the surprise of plaintiff. Plaintiff had no prior
notice of the issue, had no opportunity to conduct discovery with reference
to the issue and had no opportunity to request instructions or interrogatories
on the issue. The instructions also left out one important element of the creation of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship is
established only when it is shown that the confidence reposed by one person
was actually accepted by the other, and merely reposing confidence in another
may not, of itself, create the relationship. 36A C.J.S., Fiduciary, p. 385.
There was no evidence at trial that Mr. Fiandaca had accepted a fiduciary
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relationship. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. To support the finding
of the Court, one must believe that a fiduciary relationship was created between Mr. Fiandaca and Mr. and Mrs. Curtis on their very first meeting,
January 15, 1972. Such a finding is wholly unreasonable. The practical effect of the above quoted instructions and interrogatories, therefore, was to
direct a verdict in favor of defendant Curtis on the issue of confidential relationship, an issue that had not been previously raised. The error in submitting
that issue to the jury was so substantial and prejudicial that plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would
have been different in absence of such error. In this instance, therefore, the
trial court should be reversed. Batt vs. State, 28 Utah 417, 503 P.2d 855
(1972); Calahan vs. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 (1970); Hall vs.
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164,417 P.2d 664 (1966).

POINT II
DEFENDANTS CURTIS NEITHER ALLEGED NOR PROVED
THE ELEMENTS OF ACTIONABLE FRAUD.
Pace vs. Parrish, supra, establishes the nine essential elements of actionable fraud. They are: (1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning
a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that
he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5)
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did, in fact, rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
The matters raised in the counterclaim of defendants Curtis, at the pre-trial,
do not fall within the category of representations of presently existing material
facts. They are promises to do something in the future. It was error, therefore, for the Trial Court to submit those issues to the jury and deny plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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CONCLUSION
The effect of the Trial Court's error has been to ignore the issue of
unconscionable forfeiture, and to effectively deprive plaintiff of the value
of 40% of the time of Mr. Fiandaca for three and one-half years (Tr. 189),
and a loss of value due principally to the work and expertise of Mr. Fiandaca
of $495,000 (Tr. 281). The judgment of the Trial Court should, therefore,
be reversed and plaintiff be granted a new trial, at which plaintiff will have
had the opportunity to prepare for and meet all of the issues.
Respectfully submitted,
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER
By John H. Allen
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